Error checking with client-driven pointer analysis  by Guyer, Samuel Z. & Lin, Calvin
Science of Computer Programming 58 (2005) 83–114
www.elsevier.com/locate/scico
Error checking with client-driven pointer analysis✩
Samuel Z. Guyer∗, Calvin Lin
The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Computer Sciences, Austin, TX 78712, USA
Received 20 December 2003; received in revised form 28 May 2004; accepted 17 February 2005
Available online 31 May 2005
Abstract
This paper presents a new client-driven pointer analysis algorithm that automatically adjusts its
precision in response to the needs of client analyses. Using five significant error detection problems as
clients, we evaluate our algorithm on 18 real C programs. We compare the accuracy and performance
of our algorithm against several commonly used fixed-precision algorithms. We find that the client-
driven approach effectively balances cost and precision, often producing results as accurate as fixed-
precision algorithms that are many times more costly. Our algorithm works because many client
problems only need a small amount of extra precision applied to selected portions of each input
program.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Pointer analysis is critical for effectively analyzing programs written in languages
such as C, C++, and Java, which make heavy use of pointers and pointer-based data
structures. The goal of pointer analysis is to disambiguate indirect memory references
so that subsequent compiler passes have a more accurate view of program behavior. In
this sense, pointer analysis is not a stand-alone task: its purpose is to provide pointer
information to other client analyses.
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p = safe_string_copy("Good"); char * safe_string_copy(char * s)
q = safe_string_copy("Bad"); {
r = safe_string_copy("Ugly"); if (s != 0) return strdup(s);
else return 0;
}
Fig. 1. Context-insensitive pointer analysis hurts accuracy, but whether or not that matters depends on the client
analysis.
Existing pointer analysis algorithms differ considerably in their precision. Previous
research has generally agreed that more precise algorithms are often significantly more
costly to compute, but previous work has disagreed on whether more precise algorithms
yield more accurate results and whether these results are worth the additional cost [30,
28,19,10,26]. In fact, a recent survey by Hind claims that the choice of pointer analysis
algorithm should be dictated by the needs of the client analyses [18].
In this paper we present a new client-driven pointer analysis algorithm that addresses
this viewpoint directly: it automatically adjusts its precision to match the needs of the
client. The key idea is to discover where precision is needed by running a fast initial pass
of the client. The pointer and client analyses run together in an integrated framework,
allowing the client to provide feedback about the quality of the pointer information that it
receives. Using these initial results, our algorithm constructs a precision policy customized
to the needs of the client and input program. This approach is related to demand-driven
analysis [20,17] but solves a different problem: while demand-driven algorithms determine
which parts of the analysis need to be computed, client-driven analysis determines which
parts need to be computed using more precision.
As an example of how different clients require different amounts of precision, consider
a context-insensitive analysis of the string copying routine in Fig. 1: the pointer parameter
s merges information from all the possible input strings and transfers it to the output
string. For a client that associates dataflow facts with string buffers, this could severely
hurt accuracy—the appropriate action is to treat the routine context-sensitively. However,
for a client that is not concerned with strings, the imprecision is irrelevant.
We evaluate our algorithm using five security and error detection problems as
clients. These clients are demanding analysis problems that stress the capabilities of the
pointer analyzer, but with adequate pointer analysis support they can detect significant
and complex program defects. We compare our algorithm against four fixed-precision
algorithms on a suite of 18 real C programs. We measure the cost in terms of time and
space, and we measure the client’s accuracy simply as the number of errors reported: the
analysis is conservative, so fewer error reports always indicates fewer false positives.
This paper, which is an extended version of earlier work [16], makes the following
contributions. (1) We present a client-driven pointer analysis algorithm that adapts its
precision policy to the needs of client analyses. For our five error detection clients, this
algorithm effectively discovers where to apply more analysis effort to reduce the number
of false positives. (2) We present empirical evidence that different analysis clients benefit
from different kinds of precision—flow sensitivity, context sensitivity, or both. In most
cases only a small part of each input program needs such precision; our algorithm works
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because it automatically identifies these parts. (3) Our results show that whole-program
dataflow analysis is an accurate and efficient tool for error detection when it is given
adequate pointer information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3
describes the implementation of our framework, and Section 4 presents our client-driven
algorithm. Section 5 describes our experimental methodology. Section 6 presents our
results, and we conclude in Section 7.
2. Related work
Previous work in program analysis, including pointer analysis, has explored ways to
reduce the cost of analysis while still producing an accurate result. In this section, we
compare our client-driven algorithm with this previous work. We also describe recent
related work in error detection, focusing on the role of pointer analysis.
2.1. Precision versus cost of analysis
Iterative flow analysis [25] is an algorithm that adjusts its precision automatically in
response to the quality of the results. Plevyak and Chien use this algorithm to determine
the concrete types of objects in programs written using the Concurrent Aggregates object-
oriented language. When imprecision in the analysis causes a type conflict, the algorithm
can perform function splitting, which provides context sensitivity, or data splitting, which
divides object creation sites so that a single site can generate objects of different types.
Brylow and Palsberg use a comparable algorithm to control the level of context sensitivity
for deadline analysis of real-time, interrupt-driven software [3]. The basic mechanism
behind both of these approaches is similar to ours, but it differs in important ways. First,
since the type of an object cannot change, iterative flow analysis does not include flow
sensitivity. By contrast, our approach supports a larger class of client analyses, known as
typestate problems [32], which include flow-sensitive problems. More significantly, our
algorithm manages the precision of both the client and the pointer analysis, allowing it to
detect when pointer aliasing is the cause of information loss.
Demand-driven pointer analysis [17] reduces the cost of pointer analysis by computing
just enough information to determine the points-to sets for a specific subset of the program
variables. Client-driven pointer analysis is similar in the sense that it is driven by a specific
query into the results. However, the two algorithms use this information to manage different
aspects of the algorithm. Demand-driven pointer analysis is a fixed-precision analysis that
computes only the necessary part of the solution. Client-driven analysis dynamically varies
precision but always computes an exhaustive solution. The two ideas are complementary
and could be combined to obtain the benefits of both.
Demand interprocedural dataflow analysis [20] also avoids the cost of exhaustive
program analysis by focusing on the computation of specific dataflow facts. This algorithm
produces precise results in polynomial time for a class of dataflow analysis problems called
IFDS—interprocedural, finite, distributive, subset problems. However, this class does not
include pointer analysis, particularly when it supports strong updates, which removes the
distributive property.
86 S.Z. Guyer, C. Lin / Science of Computer Programming 58 (2005) 83–114
Combined pointer analysis [36] uses different pointer algorithms on different parts of
the program. This technique divides the assignments in a program into classes and uses
a heuristic to choose different pointer analysis algorithms for the different classes. Zhang
et al. evaluate this algorithm by measuring the number of possible objects accessed or
modified at pointer dereferences. Instead of using a heuristic, client-driven pointer analysis
is guided by feedback: it determines the need for precision dynamically by monitoring the
analysis.
A number of previous papers have compared different pointer analysis algorithms, using
both direct measurements (sizes of computed points-to sets) and indirect measurements
(transitive effects on subsequent analyses). We find that the average points-to set size is
not a good measure of the analysis because it treats all pointers as equals. For example,
one algorithm might be more accurate than another by reducing the points-to set of a
single variable by one pointer. While the overall measure is hardly affected, that one
variable could be the critical distinction for the client. We also find that error detection is
more demanding than the clients used in previous studies: the transitive benefits of higher
precision are more apparent for our clients.
2.2. Pointer analysis for error detection
One of the major challenges in analyzing C programs is to construct a model of
the store that is precise enough to support accurate error detection. Previous work has
generally settled for a low-cost fixed-policy pointer analysis, which computes minimal
store information without overwhelming the cost of error detection analysis [27,2,11].
Unfortunately, this store information often proves inadequate. Experiences with the ESP
system [7] illustrate this problem: while its dataflow analysis engine is more powerful
and more efficient than ours, the imprecision of its underlying pointer analysis can block
program verification. The authors solve this problem by manually cloning procedures in
the application in order to mimic context sensitivity. By contrast, our solution instead
automatically identifies these procedures that require context sensitivity. Our algorithm
detects when imprecision in the store model hampers the client, and our algorithm
automatically increases precision in the parts of the program where it is needed.
More recent work has focused on developing a pointer analysis specifically for error
detection [24], using the format string vulnerability as a basis for evaluation. The internal
representation used for this analysis, called IPSSA, is very similar to our interprocedural
factored def-use chains (see Section 3). Nevertheless, the approach differs from ours
in several ways. First, the analysis algorithm is fixed precision: the authors improve
performance by making an a priori decision about which parts of the application programs
need more precision (the so-called hot locations). Second, it uses unsound assumptions
to reduce the number of false positives. Our algorithm is sound (within the limitations
described later), which makes it applicable to other clients, such as optimization, which
cannot tolerate false negatives. Furthermore, sound analysis allows us to validate programs
as bug-free. Finally, we show later in this paper that detecting format string vulnerabilities
is not a problem that requires very precise analysis: almost perfect results are produced by
context-insensitive analysis.
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Table 1
Specific features of our pointer analysis framework
Feature Setting
Representation Points-to sets using storage shape graph
Flow sensitivity Configurable—on a per-object basis
Context sensitivity Configurable—on a per-procedure basis
Assignments Uni-directional (subset-based)
Strong updates Yes—when applicable (see discussion)
Flow dependences Factored use/def chains
Struct/union fields Optional—turned on by default
Program scope Whole-program, interprocedural
Heap object naming By allocation site (with context sensitivity; see discussion)
Pointer arithmetic Limited to pointers within an object
Arrays All elements represented by a single node
3. Analysis framework
Our analysis framework is part of the Broadway compiler system, which supports high-
level analysis and optimization of C programs [15,13]. In this section we describe the
details of this framework, including the overall architecture, the representation of pointer
information, and the analysis algorithm. Our framework has two enabling features that
are critical to our client-driven analysis algorithm. First, it solves both the pointer and
client analysis problems simultaneously, which allows it to monitor and control their
interaction. Second, it allows precision to be specified at a fine grain: context sensitivity
can be controlled on a per-procedure basis, and flow sensitivity can be controlled on a
per-memory-location basis. The client-driven algorithm supplies the precision policy that
decides which procedures to make context-sensitive and which memory locations to make
flow-sensitive.
Table 1 summarizes the design dimensions of our analysis framework. It brings together
several commonly used algorithms for pointer and dataflow analysis, each with its own cost
and precision characteristics [1,5,9,12,22]. The main contribution of this paper is not a new
addition to these algorithms, but rather a mechanism for combining different algorithms
during analysis and a policy for choosing which algorithm to use on which parts of the
input programs.
We use a lightweight annotation language to specify the client analysis problems [14].
The error checking clients that we present in Section 5 are all designed to detect improper
or unsafe use of system library calls in application programs. The language is designed
to extend compiler support to software libraries; it is not used to describe the application
programs themselves. The language allows us to concisely summarize the pointer behavior
of library routines, and it provides a way to define new library-specific dataflow analysis
problems.
The remainder of this section describes our analysis framework, which provides
the underlying analysis mechanisms. The framework consists of the following major
components:
88 S.Z. Guyer, C. Lin / Science of Computer Programming 58 (2005) 83–114
Fig. 2. Our framework implements context sensitivity by cloning. (a) Context insensitivity allows unrealizable
paths: information generated at foo() (1) is merged at the shared procedure yadda() (2) and flows to the call
site in bar() (3). (b) With cloning (4), the two paths are kept separate.
• Program representation: a traditional intermediate representation consisting of simple
statements organized into a control-flow graph.
• Memory representation: a storage shape graph in which the vertices represent memory
locations (variables and heap objects), and the edges represent points-to relationships.
• Analysis algorithm: an iterative dataflow analysis algorithm that simultaneously
computes pointer information and solves client dataflow analysis problems.
3.1. Program representation
Our internal program representation supports the analysis framework in three ways: (1)
it represents C code in a canonical form that consists of sequences of simple operations
organized into a control-flow graph, (2) it enables whole-program analysis by bringing
together all the procedures in a program (even across multiple source files) and organizing
them into a call graph, (3) it provides per-procedure context sensitivity through procedure
cloning.
Our compiler accepts as input a set of C source files, which it processes in several
ways in preparation for analysis. In particular, it dismantles the code into a medium-level
intermediate representation. This IR consists of simple assignment statements, similar to
three-address instructions, organized into basic blocks, which are in turn organized into a
control-flow graph. This representation preserves some of the high-level constructs of C,
such as struct types, union types, and array indexing.
Our system implements per-procedure context sensitivity by altering the program
representation to make each calling context explicit. To apply context sensitivity to a
procedure our compiler creates a logical clone of the procedure for each of its call
sites. Fig. 2 shows an example of this cloning process on a program’s call graph. In the
figure the yadda() procedure is used at two different call sites. Cloning the procedure
provides a separate copy for each call site. This approach provides a uniform view of
the program structure, independent of context sensitivity. Specifically, since our analysis
algorithm associates dataflow facts with program points, cloning a procedure provides a
separate set of program points, thereby keeping dataflow facts from the different calling
contexts separate. Recent research has produced more efficient methods of implementing
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context sensitivity [23,34,35], but we show in Section 6 that the amount of context
sensitivity needed is typically small.
To analyze a context-insensitive procedure we create a single instantiation and merge
the information from all of its call sites. Since our analysis is interprocedural, we still
visit all of the calling contexts. However, when no changes occur to the input flow values,
the analyzer can often skip a context-insensitive procedure call, which helps the analysis
converge quickly. The main drawback of context-insensitive analysis is that it suffers from
the unrealizable paths problem [35]: analysis information from one call site flows back to
all the other call sites. Fig. 2 shows how this problem can affect dataflow analysis. Without
context sensitivity, dataflow information merges at the shared procedure yadda() and
flows back to all call sites. As a result dataflow information from foo() flows to bar(),
an unrealizable path. Cloning the shared procedure keeps separate the information from
the two callers.
3.2. Memory representation
Our representation of the objects in a program is based on the storage shape graph [4],
adapted for C programs, and it includes a number of improvements developed in more
recent work [9,22,35]. The memory representation plays two important roles in the
analysis: (1) it manages the memory abstraction, including the granularity of the memory
model and the mapping from abstract memory locations to concrete memory locations, and
(2) it provides per-object flow sensitivity by managing how flow values are associated with
objects. For flow-sensitive objects, the system builds factored def-use chains and associates
a separate flow value with each def; for flow-insensitive objects the system maintains a
single flow value and does not need to compute reaching definitions.
The nodes of our storage shape graph represent all addressable objects in memory,
including variables, structures, arrays, and heap allocated memory. We decompose
complex objects into finer structures in order to more accurately model their behavior. For
example, each field of a structure is represented by a separate node, and each instantiation
of a structure includes a full set of these field nodes. We represent all the elements of an
array with a single node.
The nodes that represent program variables (local and global) are indexed by their
declarations. This scheme produces the expected behavior for context-sensitive procedures:
each clone of the procedure has its own set of local variables, and thus its own set of nodes,
thereby keeping the analysis information separate in each calling context.
We index heap-allocated memory according to the program location of the allocation—
typically, a call to malloc() or calloc(). By using the program location as the index,
we obtain the same naming behavior for heap allocated memory as for local variables:
in the context-insensitive case, our system generates one node for each static call to
malloc(), while in the context-sensitive case, it generates one node for each call to
malloc() in each procedure clone.
For flow-sensitive objects our framework records their uses and defs and organizes them
into factored use–def chains [31]. This data structure is similar in spirit to SSA form [6],
and it is well-suited for efficient dataflow analysis, especially for sparse problems, such
as pointer analysis, constant propagation, and many kinds of error checking. The analyzer
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void main() void foo(int * p)
{ {
int x; if (some_condition)
int y; (*p) = 6;
else
foo(&x); (*p) = 7;
foo(&y); // -- Phi function: merge x or y ?
} }
Fig. 3. Our variation of SSA form separates φ functions that occur in different contexts.
associates dataflow facts, such as points-to sets and client lattice flow values, with each
def of an object in memory (node in the storage shape graph). At a use of the object, the
analysis can quickly retrieve the current values by following the use–def chain.
Our representation of factored use–def chains differs from traditional SSA form because
it is designed to overcome some of the limitations of SSA form. These limitations
become apparent when performing interprocedural analysis in the presence of pointers.
The example code in Fig. 3 shows two of these problems. The procedure foo modifies
a variable indirectly through a pointer, but since the modification occurs in a conditional
branch, SSA form requires a φ function at the confluence point to merge the flow values.
The first problem is that the procedure is called in two places, with two different input
values for p, address of x and address of y. However, the mergepoint in foo only
merges one of the variables, depending on the calling context. The second problem is
that the analyzer only discovers the need for these mergepoints during the pointer analysis.
Therefore, we cannot separate the computation of use–def chains from the pointer analysis.
Previous work addresses this problem by creating a synthetic name for the target of the
pointer p and adding a mergepoint for that synthetic variable [35]. Using this approach,
the analyzer must compute a binding between actual arguments and synthetics arguments
at each call site. Our approach is simpler and more flexible: we store the use–def chains in
a separate data structure and avoid modifying the program at all. The analyzer represents
the use–def chains for each variable as a directed graph consisting of use nodes and def
nodes, each of which is associated with a program location. For the example in Fig. 3, our
analyzer creates a separate set of use–def chains for x and y. In addition, it creates these
use–def chains on the fly, as it discovers each calling context and set of input arguments.
For flow-insensitive objects our framework maintains only a single flow value and
simply accumulates updates into that value. Flow insensitivity significantly reduces the
cost of analysis because there is no need to compute reaching definitions for these objects.
This savings is particularly significant for global variables and heap-allocated memory,
whose reaching definitions can span many procedures. For example, a frequently modified
global variable might have a complex web of use–def chains that wind throughout the
whole program.
Our implementation of flow insensitivity deviates from the traditional definition of
flow insensitivity because we still visit statements in program order. As a result, our
flow-insensitive analysis can be more precise than an analysis that computes the same
result independent of the order in which it visits statements. Fig. 4 shows an example that
highlights the difference in our algorithm. In a traditional flow-insensitive analysis, the
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// Traditional Our implementation
p = &x; // p -> {x} p -> {x}
q = p; // q -> {x} q -> {x}
p = &y; // p -> {x,y}, q -> {x,y} p -> {x,y}, q -> {x}
Fig. 4. Our implementation of flow-insensitive analysis is more precise than the traditional definition because we
respect the ordering of the statements.
presence of an assignment, such as q = p, forces the two variables to always be equal.
In our implementation, we take advantage of the fact that the second assignment to p
occurs after the assignment q = p, and therefore it cannot affect the value of q. Note
that we continue to use iterative analysis even for flow-insensitive variables, which ensures
correctness in loops.
For each flow-sensitive object we store its defs in a list that is ordered so that we can
quickly find reaching definitions at any program location [35]: a def is never preceded in
the list by another def that dominates it. We can find the nearest reaching def by searching
the list linearly: the first def that dominates the current program location is the nearest
reaching definition. We use the same algorithm to insert new defs in the list. This approach
is not as fast, asymptotically, as the dominator skeleton tree proposed by Chase et al. [4],
but it works well in practice.
3.3. Analysis algorithm
The analysis algorithm performs two main tasks. First, it analyzes statements in the
program and builds our modified SSA form, which represents data dependences for the
various nodes in the program, including pointers. Second, it manages client dataflow
analysis problems through a series of hooks. Overall convergence of the analysis occurs
when all of the individual analyses converge.
Our framework solves both the pointer analysis and client analyses using the iterative
dataflow analysis algorithm introduced by Kildall [21]. We extend the algorithm in a
straightforward way to interprocedural analysis: when the analyzer encounters a procedure
call, it immediately begins analyzing the body of the callee procedure. The analysis
framework computes dataflow facts by evaluating each statement in program order, looking
up flow values for the uses of variables, and updating flow values for defs of variables. It
manages this process using a worklist of basic blocks for each procedure.
Flow values come in two varieties: points-to sets (for pointer analysis) and client flow
values. Points-to sets are simply sets of nodes in the storage shape graph. For points-to
sets the lattice meet function, denoted by the  operator, is the set union operation. Client
flow values are named types, organized into an explicit lattice structure. For example, we
could model colors using a simple lattice consisting of “Red”, “Green”, and “Blue”, and
the pairwise combinations “Yellow”, “Purple”, “Aqua”. The meet function would specify,
for example, that “Red”  “Blue” = “Purple”. This information is specified using our
annotation language, which we describe in Section 5.2.
The analysis algorithm includes many engineering details, but for the purposes of
describing the client-driven analysis algorithm we only need to describe two parts in detail:
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assignments and procedure calls. These two components use the lattice meet function to
implement flow insensitivity and context insensitivity, respectively. Later in the paper, we
show how the client-driven algorithm monitors these components and adjusts precision to
avoid using the meet function.
We can divide assignments into two general categories: assignments that dereference
a pointer and assignments through a pointer. There are many other assignment forms,
but we can handle them as special cases of, or combinations of, these two categories. In
addition, there are other operators, such as field accesses and arithmetic operators, which
our algorithm handles properly but that do not bear on the precision of the analysis. During
this process we also record when dataflow information changes and update the worklists
accordingly.
We evaluate an assignment of the form x = *p using the following steps:
(1) Dereference p. If p is a flow-sensitive variable, then we find the points-to set for p by
following the use–def chain to its nearest reaching definition and retrieving the points-
to set associated with that def. If p is a flow-insensitive variable, then we retrieve the
points-to set associated with the variable itself—there are no use–def chains. The result
of this operation is a set of right-hand-side nodes, R.
(2) Look up right-hand-side flow values. For each element r of R, we find the flow
values for r using the same process described above for p. The result is two sets of
flow values, one for the pointer analysis and one for the client analysis: (1) Vp , a set of
points-to sets, and (2) Vc, a set of client flow values. Each r contributes one points-to
set and one client flow value to each set.
(3) Merge right-hand-side flow values. We then compute a single points-to set and a
single client flow value to represent all the possible right-hand-side values. We use the
lattice meet function to compute these values: m p = Vp and mc = Vc.
(4) Record left-hand-side flow value. If x is a flow-sensitive variable, then we create a
def for x at the current program location and store the flow values m p and mc with the
def. If x is a flow-insensitive variable, then we look up the current values associated
with the variable and merge in the new values using the meet function again.
We evaluate an assignment of the form *p = y using the following steps:
(1) Dereference p. This step is identical to step (1) above, except that we refer to the
resulting points-to set as L, the set of left-hand-side nodes. Notice that because our
analysis is a “may point to” analysis, p can have multiple targets.
(2) Look up right-hand-side flow values. This step is like step (2) above, except that we
have only one right-hand side, y. The result is a single points-to set and client flow
value for y, vp and vc.
(3) Assign to left-hand sides. Since our analysis supports strong updates, this step has two
cases: (1) L contains exactly one flow-sensitive variable, so we apply a strong update
on the flow values, (2) L contains multiple targets or the targets are flow-insensitive, in
which case we apply a weak update. A strong update allows the analyzer to store a new
flow value independent of any previous defs of the variable. A weak update forces the
analyzer to use the meet function to merge the new flow value with that of the previous
reaching definition.
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Fig. 5. Our analysis framework allows client analyses to provide feedback, which drives corrective adjustments
to the precision.
Finally, we evaluate a procedure call proc(x, y, ...) using a series of
assignments from the actual parameters to the formal parameters. This process is identical
to that of the first type of assignment described above. Notice, though, that for context
insensitive procedures, the assignment effectively occurs at the entry of the procedure, and
therefore produces only a single def for the formal parameter. This forces the analysis to
merge the flow values from each callsite using the meet function.
4. Client-driven algorithm
Our client-driven pointer analysis is a two-pass algorithm. The key idea is to use a fast
low-precision pointer analysis in the first pass to discover which parts of the program need
more precision. The algorithm uses this information to construct a fine-grained customized
precision policy for the second pass. This approach requires a tight coupling between
the pointer analysis and the client analyses: in addition to providing memory access
information to the client, the pointer analyzer receives feedback from the client about
the accuracy of the client flow values. For example, the client analysis can report when
a confluence point, such as a control-flow merge or context-insensitive procedure call,
adversely affects the accuracy of its analysis. The simple interface between the pointer
analyzer and the client is the core mechanism that allows the framework to tailor its
precision for the particular client and target program.
The implementation of this algorithm (see Fig. 5) adds two components to our analysis
framework: a monitor that detects and tracks loss of information during program analysis,
and an adaptor that uses the output of the monitor to adjust the precision. During
program analysis, the monitor identifies the places where information is lost, and it uses a
dependence graph to track the memory locations that are subsequently affected. When
analysis is complete the client performs its tasks—after which it reports back to the
adaptor with a set of memory locations that are not sufficiently accurate for its purposes.
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Borrowing terminology from demand-driven analysis, we refer to this set as the query.
The adaptor starts with the locations in the query and tracks their values back through
the dependence graph. The nodes and edges that make up this back-trace indicate which
variables and procedures need more precision. The framework then reruns the analysis
with the customized precision policy.
Although the algorithm detects information loss during analysis, it waits until the
analysis is complete before changing precision. One reason for this is pragmatic:
our framework cannot change precision during analysis and recompute the results
incrementally. The other reason is more fundamental: during analysis it is not readily
apparent that imprecision detected in a particular pointer value will adversely affect the
client later in the program. For example, a program may contain a pointer variable with
numerous assignments, causing the points-to set to grow large. However, if the client
analysis never needs the value of the pointer then it is not worth expending extra effort
to disambiguate it. By waiting to see its impact, we significantly reduce the amount of
precision added by the algorithm.
4.1. Polluting assignments
The monitor runs alongside the main pointer analysis and client analysis, detecting
information loss and recording its effects. Loss of information occurs when conservative
assumptions about program behavior force the analyzer to merge flow values. The analysis
algorithm described in Section 3.3 contains several steps that use the lattice meet function
to compute these conservative values. In fact, any place where the analyzer uses the lattice
meet function can potentially result in loss of information. In particular, we are interested in
the cases where accurate, but conflicting, information is merged, resulting in an inaccurate
value—we refer to this as a polluting assignment.
For “may” pointer analysis smaller points-to sets indicate more accurate information—
a points-to set of size one is the most accurate. In this case the pointer relationship is
unambiguous, and assignments through the pointer allow strong updates [4]. Therefore,
a pointer assignment is polluting if it combines two or more unambiguous pointers and
produces an ambiguous pointer.
For the client analysis, information loss is problem-specific, but we can define it
generally in terms of dataflow lattice values. We take the compiler community’s view of
lattices: higher lattice values represent better analysis information. Lower lattice values are
more conservative, with lattice bottom denoting the worst case. Therefore, a client update
is polluting if it combines a set of lattice values and produces a lattice value that is lower
than any of the individual members.
We classify polluting assignments according to their cause. In our framework there are
three ways that conservative analysis can directly cause the loss of information [8]. We
will refer to them as directly polluting assignments, and they can occur in both the pointer
analysis and the client analysis:
• Context-insensitive procedure call: the parameter assignment merges conflicting
information from different call sites.
• Flow-insensitive assignment: multiple assignments to a single memory location merge
conflicting information.
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Table 2
For each type of polluting assignment the monitor adds a node into the graph and labels it according to the action
needed to improve the precision
Code Imprecision Effect Monitor action
foo(5); Context-insensitive Param to foo = ⊥ Add a node for foo
foo(6); Label needs context sensitivity
bar(&a); Context-insensitive Param to bar Add a node for bar
bar(&b); points-to a or b Label needs context sensitivity
x = 5; Flow-insensitive x = ⊥ Add a node for x
x = 6; Label needs flow sensitivity
p = &a; Flow-insensitive p points-to a or b Add a node for p
p = &b; Label needs flow sensitivity




• Control-flow merge: the SSA φ function merges conflicting information from different
control-flow paths.
The current implementation of the algorithm is only concerned with the first two classes.
It can detect loss of information at control-flow merges, but it currently has no corrective
mechanism, such as node splitting or path sensitivity, to remedy it.
In addition to these classes, there are two kinds of polluting assignments that are caused
specifically by ambiguous pointers. These assignments are critical to the client-driven
algorithm because they capture the relationship between accuracy in the pointer analysis
and accuracy in the client. We refer to them as indirectly polluting assignments:
• Weak access: the right-hand side of the assignment dereferences an ambiguous pointer,
which merges conflicting information from the pointer targets.
• Weak update: the left-hand side assigns through an ambiguous pointer, forcing a weak
update that loses information.
4.2. Monitoring analysis
During analysis, the monitor detects the five kinds of polluting assignments described
above, both for the client analysis and the pointer analysis, and it records this information
in a directed dependence graph. The goal of the dependence graph is to capture the effects
of polluting assignments on subsequent parts of the program.
Each node in the graph represents a memory location whose analysis information, either
points-to set or client flow value, is polluted. The graph contains a node for each location
that is modified by a directly polluting assignment, and each node has a label that lists
all of the directly polluting assignments to that memory location. The monitor builds this
graph online by adding nodes to the graph and adding assignments to the labels as they
are discovered during analysis. These nodes represent the sources of polluted information,
and the labels indicate how to fix the imprecision. Table 2 shows examples of polluting
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Table 3
Complicit assignments track imprecision backwards across assignments,
allowing the system to find the polluting assignments that are the sources of
the imprecision
Code Initially Effect Monitor action
x = y; y = ⊥ x = ⊥ Add a node for x
Add edge x → y
p = q; q points-to a or b p points-to a or b Add a node for p
Add edge p → q
Fig. 6. Both code fragments assign bottom to z: in (1) x is responsible; in (2) p is responsible.
assignments and the actions taken both for pointers and for constant propagation as an
example client.
The dependence graph contains two types of directed edges. The first type of edge
represents an assignment that passes polluted information from one location to another. We
refer to this as a complicit assignment (see Table 3), and it occurs whenever the memory
locations on the right-hand side are already represented in the dependence graph. The
monitor creates nodes for the affected left-hand side locations and adds edges from those
nodes back to the right-hand side nodes. Note that the direction of the edge is opposite the
direction of assignment so that we can trace dependences backward in the program. The
second type of edge represents indirectly polluting assignments. The monitor adds nodes
for the left-hand side locations and adds a directed edge from each of these nodes back to
the offending pointer variable. This kind of edge is unique to our analysis because it allows
our algorithm to distinguish between the following two situations: (1) an unambiguous
pointer whose target is polluted, and (2) an ambiguous pointer whose targets have precise
information.
Fig. 6 illustrates this distinction using constant propagation as an example client. Both
code fragments assign lattice bottom to z, but for different reasons. Case (1) is caused by
the polluted value of x, so the monitor adds an edge in the dependence graph from z back
to x. Case (2), however, is caused by the polluted value of the pointer p, so the monitor
adds an edge from z to p.
We store the program locations of all assignments, but for performance reasons the
monitor dependence graph is fundamentally a flow-insensitive data structure. As a result,
the algorithm cannot tell which specific assignments to a memory location affect other
locations. For example, a location might have multiple polluting assignments, some of
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which occur later in the program than complicit assignments that read its value. In most
cases, this simplification does not noticeably hurt the algorithm, but occasionally it leads
to overly aggressive precision, particularly when it involves global variables that are used
in many different places and for different purposes.
4.3. Diagnosing information loss
After the first pass of the analysis, the client provides feedback to the adaptor in the form
of a query, indicating where it needs more accuracy. The adaptor uses the dependence
graph to construct a precision policy specifically tailored to obtain the desired accuracy.
The output of the adaptor is thus a set of memory locations that need flow sensitivity and
a set of procedures that need context sensitivity. The new precision policy applies to both
the pointer analysis and the client analysis.
The client query consists of a set of memory locations that have “unsatisfactory” flow
values. For example, if the client tests a variable for a particular flow value but finds lattice
bottom, it could add that variable to the query. The goal of the adaptor is to improve the
accuracy of the memory locations in the query. The corresponding nodes in the dependence
graph serve as a starting point, and the set of nodes reachable from those nodes represents
all the memory locations whose inaccuracy directly or indirectly affects the flow values of
the query. The key to the efficiency of our algorithm is that this subgraph is typically much
smaller than the whole graph—we rarely need to fix all of the polluting assignments.
The adaptor starts at the query nodes in the graph and visits all of the reachable nodes
in the graph. This traversal effectively computes a backwards slice of the program that
includes all the assignments that may generate or propagate inaccuracy to the nodes in
the query. The adaptor collects the labels on the nodes and applies the specified corrective
measures: for polluting parameter assignments it adds the corresponding procedure to the
set of procedures that need context sensitivity; for flow-insensitive assignments it adds the
corresponding memory location to the set of locations that need flow sensitivity.
Before making any changes to the policy, the adaptor checks each proposed precision
enhancement. It verifies that flow sensitivity will help by making sure that there are
actually multiple assignments to the object. For example, a polluting assignment could
occur in a loop: a variable has a precise flow value until the second time we visit the loop
body. It might help to peel the loop, but the current implementation just prunes out these
cases.
To verify that context sensitivity will help, the adaptor re-evaluates the parameters at
each call site. For the client analysis, we make sure that the object in question actually
has different values at different call sites. For pointers, we perform two checks: we make
sure that the points-to sets are different at different call sites, and we check that any client
objects reachable from those pointers have different states. If the final incoming flow values
are not different, then we prune the procedure from the context-sensitive set.
4.4. Chaining precision
In addition to addressing each polluting assignment, the adaptor increases precision
along the path from each polluting assignment back to the original query nodes. When it
finds a node that needs flow sensitivity, it also applies this additional precision to all the
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nodes back along the path. When it makes a procedure context-sensitive, it also determines
the set of procedures that contain all the complicit assignments back along the path, and it
adds that set to the context-sensitive set. This chaining ensures that intermediate locations
preserve the additional accuracy that comes from fixing the polluting assignments.
By aggressively chaining the precision, we also avoid the need for additional analysis
passes. The initial pass computes the least precise analysis information and therefore covers
all the regions of the program for which more precision might be beneficial. Any polluting
assignments detected in later passes would necessarily occur within these regions and
thus would already be addressed in the customized precision policy. We validated this
design decision empirically: subsequent passes typically discover only spurious instances
of imprecision and do not improve the quality of the client analysis.
5. Experiments
In this section we describe our experiments, including our methodology, the five error
detection clients, and the input programs. The query that these clients provide to the adaptor
consists of the set of memory locations that trigger errors. We compare both the cost and the
accuracy of our algorithm against four fixed-precision algorithms. In Section 6 we present
the empirical results.
We run all experiments on a Dell OptiPlex GX-400, with a Pentium 4 processor running
at 1.7 GHz and 2 GB of main memory. The machine runs Linux with the 2.4.18 kernel.
Our system is implemented entirely in C++ and compiled using the GNU g++ compiler
version 3.0.3.
5.1. Methodology
Our suite of experiments consists of 18 C programs, five error detection problems, and
five pointer analysis algorithms—four fixed-precision pointer algorithms and our client-
driven algorithm. The fixed-precision algorithms consist of the four possible combinations
of flow sensitivity and context sensitivity—we refer to them in the results as CIFI, CIFS,
CSFI, and CSFS. For each combination of program, error problem, and pointer analysis
algorithm, we run the analyzer and collect a variety of measurements, including analysis
time, memory consumption, and number of errors reported.
The number of errors reported is the most important of these metrics. The more false
positives an algorithm produces, the more time a programmer must spend sorting through
them to find the real errors. Our experience is that this is an extremely tedious and time
consuming task. The use of a fast, inaccurate error detection algorithm is false economy: it
trades computer time, which is cheap and plentiful, for programmer time, which is valuable
and limited. We believe that it is preferable to use a more expensive algorithm that can
reduce the number of false positives, even if it has to run overnight or over the weekend.
When two algorithms report the same number of errors, we compare them in terms of
analysis time and memory consumption.
In some cases, we know the actual number of errors present in the programs. This
information comes from security advisories published by organizations such as CERT
and SecurityFocus. We have also manually inspected some of the programs to validate
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property FileState : { Open, Closed } initially Closed
procedure fopen(path, mode)
{
on_exit { return --> new file_stream --> new file_handle }
analyze FileState { file_handle <- Open }
}
procedure fgets(s, size, f)
{
on_entry { f --> file_stream --> handle }
error if (FileState : handle could-be Closed) "Error: file might be closed";
}
Fig. 7. Annotations for tracking file state: to properly model files and files descriptors, we associate the state with
an abstract “handle”.
the errors. For the client-driven algorithm we also record the number of procedures that it
makes context-sensitive and the number of memory locations that it makes flow-sensitive.
Unlike previous research on pointer analysis, we do not present data on the points-to set
sizes because this metric is not relevant to our algorithm.
5.2. Error detection clients
We define the five error detection client analyses using an annotation language [14],
which allows us to define simple dataflow analysis problems that are associated with a
library interface: for each library routine, we specify how it affects the flow values of
the problem. The language also provides a way to test the results of the analysis and
generate reports. For each analysis problem we show some representative examples of
the annotations.
These error detection problems represent realistic errors that actually occur in practice
and can cause serious damage. Like many error detection problems, they involve data
structures, such as buffers and file handles, that are allocated on the heap and manipulated
through pointers. The lifetimes of these data structures often cross many procedures,
requiring interprocedural analysis to properly model. Thus, they present a considerable
challenge for the pointer analyzer.
5.2.1. File access errors
Library interfaces often contain implicit constraints on the order in which their routines
may be called. File access rules are one example of this kind of usage constraint. A program
can only access a file between the proper open and close calls. The purpose of this client
analysis is to detect possible violations of this usage rule. The first line in Fig. 7 defines
the flow value for this analysis, which consists of the two possible states, “Open” and
“Closed”. Fig. 8(a) depicts the lattice structure for this dataflow analysis.
To track this state, we annotate the various library functions that open and close files.
Fig. 7 shows the annotations for the fopen() function. The on_entry and on_exit
annotations describe the pointer behavior of the routine: it returns a pointer to a new file
stream, which points to a new file handle. The analyze annotation sets the state of the
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Fig. 8. Each property annotation implies a dataflow lattice. The nesting structure of the property values implies
the meet function.
newly created file handle to open. At each use of a file stream or file descriptor, we check
to make sure the state is open. Fig. 7 also shows an annotation for the fgets() function,
which emits an error if the file could be closed.
5.2.2. Format string vulnerability (FSV)
A number of output functions in the Standard C Library, such as printf() and
syslog(), take a format string argument that controls output formatting. A format string
vulnerability (FSV) occurs when untrusted data ends up as part of the format string. A
hacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending the program a carefully crafted input string
that causes part of the code to be overwritten with new instructions. These vulnerabilities
represent a serious security problem that has been the subject of many CERT advisories.
To detect format string vulnerabilities we define an analysis that determines when data
from an untrusted source can become part of a format string. We consider data to be
tainted [33,27] when it comes from an untrusted source. We track this data through the
program to make sure that all format string arguments are untainted.
Our formulation of the Taint analysis starts with a definition of the Taint property, shown
at the top of Fig. 9, which consists of two possible values, Tainted and Untainted.
We then annotate the Standard C Library functions that produce tainted data. These include
such obvious sources of untrusted data as scanf() and read(), and less obvious ones
such as readdir() and getenv(). Fig. 9 shows the annotations for the read() rou-
tine. Notice that the annotations assign the Tainted property to the contents of the buffer
rather than to the buffer pointer. We then annotate string manipulation functions to reflect
how taintedness can propagate from one string to another. The example in Fig. 9 annotates
the strdup() function: the string copy has the same Taint value as the input string.
Finally, we annotate all the library functions that accept format strings (including
sprintf()) to report when the format string is tainted. Fig. 9 shows the annotation for
the syslog() function, which is often the culprit in FSV attacks.
5.2.3. Remote access vulnerability
Hostile clients can only manipulate programs through the various program inputs. We
can approximate the extent of this control by tracking the input data and observing how it
is used. We label input sources, such as file handles and sockets, according to their level of
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property Taint : { Tainted, Untainted } initially Untainted
procedure read(fd, buffer_ptr, size)
{
on_entry { buffer_ptr --> buffer }




on_entry { s --> string }
on_exit { return --> string_copy }
analyze Taint { string_copy <- string }
}
procedure syslog(prio, fmt, args)
{
on_entry { fmt --> fmt_string }
error if (Taint : fmt_string could-be Tainted) "Error: tainted format string";
}
Fig. 9. Annotations defining the Taint analysis: taintedness is associated with strings and buffers and can be
transferred between them.
property Trust : { Remote { External { Internal }}}
procedure socket(domain, type, protocol}
{
on_exit { return --> new file_handle }
analyze Trust {
if (domain == AF_UNIX) file_handle <- External





on_entry { path --> path_string }
on_exit { return --> new file_handle }
analyze Trust { file_handle <- path_string }
}
Fig. 10. Annotations defining the Trust analysis. Note the cascading effect: we only trust data from a file handle
if we trust the file name used to open it.
trust. All data read from these sources is labeled likewise. The first line of Fig. 10 defines
the three levels of trust in our analysis—internal (trusted), locally trusted (for example,
local files), and remote (untrusted). Fig. 8(b) depicts the lattice structure for this dataflow
analysis. Notice that the nesting of the three property values creates a vertical lattice,
which captures the fact that Remote is more conservative than External, which is more
conservative than Internal.
We start by annotating functions that return fundamentally untrusted data sources, such
as Internet sockets. Fig. 10 shows the annotations for the socket() function. The level
102 S.Z. Guyer, C. Lin / Science of Computer Programming 58 (2005) 83–114
of trust depends on the type of socket being created. When the program reads data from
these sources, the buffers are marked with the Trust level of the source.
The Trust analysis has two distinguishing features. First, data is only as trustworthy as
its least trustworthy source. For example, if the program reads both trusted and untrusted
data into a single buffer, then we consider the whole buffer to be untrusted. The nested
structure of the lattice definition captures this fact. Second, untrusted data has a domino
effect on other data sources and sinks. For example, if the file name argument to open() is
untrusted, then we treat all data read from that file descriptor as untrusted. The annotations
in Fig. 10 implement this policy.
As with the earlier Taint analysis, we annotate string manipulation functions to
propagate the Trust values from one buffer to another. We generate an error message when
untrusted data reaches certain sensitive routines, including any file system manipulation or
program execution routines, such as exec().
5.2.4. Remote FSV
The Taint analysis defined above tends to find many format string vulnerabilities that
are not exploitable security holes. For example, consider a program that uses data from a
file as part of a format string. If a hacker can dictate the name of the file or can control
the contents of the file, then the program contains a remotely exploitable vulnerability. If a
hacker cannot control the file, however, then the program still contains a vulnerability, but
the vulnerability does not have security implications.
To identify exploitable format string vulnerabilities more precisely, we can combine the
Taint analysis with the Trust analysis, which specifically tracks data from remote sources.
No new dataflow analyses are needed. We simply revise the error test so that it only emits
an error message when the format string is tainted and it comes from a remote source.
5.2.5. FTP behavior
The most complex of our client analyses checks to see if a program can behave like
an FTP (file transfer protocol) server. Specifically, we want to determine if the program
could possibly send the contents of a file to a remote client, where the name of the file
is determined, at least in part, by the remote client itself. This behavior is not necessarily
incorrect: it is the normal operation of the two FTP daemons that we present in our results.
We can use this error checker to make sure the behavior is not unintended (for example, in
a finger daemon) or to validate the expected behavior of the FTP programs.
We use the Trust analysis defined above to determine when untrusted data is read from
one stream to another. However, we need to know that one stream is associated with a file
and the other with a remote socket. Fig. 11 defines the flow value to track different type
of sources and sinks of data. We can distinguish between different type of sockets, such as
“Server” sockets, which have bound addresses for listening, and “Client” sockets, which
are the result of accepting a connection.
Whenever a new file descriptor is opened, we mark it according to the type. In addition,
like the other analyses, we associate this type with any data read from it. We check for FTP
behavior in the write() family of routines, shown in Fig. 11, by testing both the buffer
and the file descriptor.
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property FDKind : { File, Client, Server, Pipe, Command, StdIO }
procedure write(fd, buffer_ptr, size)
{
on_entry { buffer_ptr --> buffer
fd --> file_handle }
error if ((FDKind : buffer could-be File) &&
(Trust : buffer could-be Remote) &&
(FDKind : file_handle could-be Client) &&
(Trust : file_handle could-be Remote))
"Error: possible FTP behavior";
}
Fig. 11. Annotations to track type of data sources and sinks. In combination with Trust analysis, we can check
whether a call to write() behaves like FTP.
Table 4
Properties of the input programs
Program Description Priv LOC CFG nodes Procedures
stunnel 3.8 Secure TCP wrapper Yes 2K/13K 2264 42
pfingerd 0.7.8 Finger daemon Yes 5K/30K 3638 47
muh 2.05c IRC proxy Yes 5K/25K 5191 84
muh 2.05d IRC proxy Yes 5K/25K 5390 84
pure-ftpd 1.0.15 FTP server Yes 13K/45K 11,239 116
crond (fcron-2.9.3) Cron daemon Yes 9K/40K 11,310 100
apache 1.3.12 (core only) Web server Yes 30K/67K 16,755 313
make 3.75 Make 21K/50K 18,581 167
BlackHole 1.0.9 E-mail filter 12K/244K 21,370 71
wu-ftpd 2.6.0 FTP server Yes 21K/64K 22,196 183
openssh client 3.5p1 Secure shell client 38K/210K 22,411 441
privoxy 3.0.0 Web server proxy Yes 27K/48K 22,608 223
wu-ftpd 2.6.2 FTP server Yes 22K/66K 23,107 205
named (BIND 4.9.4) DNS server Yes 26K/84K 25,452 210
openssh daemon 3.5p1 Secure shell server Yes 50K/299K 29,799 601
cfengine 1.5.4 System admin tool Yes 34K/350K 36,573 421
sqlite 2.7.6 SQL database 36K/67K 43,333 387
nn 6.5.6 News reader 36K/116K 46,336 494
Many of the programs run in privileged mode, making their security critical. Lines of code (LOC) is given
both before and after preprocessing. CFG nodes measures the size of the program in our compiler’s internal
representation—the table is sorted on this column.
5.3. Programs
Table 4 describes our input programs. We use these particular programs for our
experiments for a number of reasons. First, they are all real programs, taken from open-
source projects, with all of the nuances and complexities of production software. Second,
many of them are system tools or daemons that have significant security implications
because they provide privileged services and interact with remote clients. Finally, several
of them are specific versions of programs that are identified by security advisories as
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Fig. 12. Checking file access requires flow sensitivity, but not context sensitivity. The client-driven algorithm
beats the other algorithms because it makes only the file-related objects flow-sensitive.
containing format string vulnerabilities. In these cases, we also obtain subsequent versions
in which the bugs are fixed, so that we can confirm their absence.
We present several measures of program size, including number of lines of source code,
number of lines of preprocessed code, and number of procedures. The table is sorted by
the number of CFG nodes, and we use this ordering in all subsequent tables.
6. Results
We measure the results for all combinations of pointer analysis algorithms, error
detection clients, and input programs—a total of over 400 experiments. We present the
results in five graphs, one for each error detection client (see Figs. 12–16). Each bar on
the graph shows the accuracy and performance of the different analysis algorithms on the
given program. To more easily compare different programs we normalize all execution
times to the time of the fastest algorithm on that program, which in all cases is the context-
insensitive, flow-insensitive algorithm. Each point on these graphs represents a single
combination of error detection client, input program, and analysis algorithm. We label each
point with the number of errors reported in that combination. For example, from Fig. 12 we
see that for the stunnel program, the CI-FI algorithm reports eight errors, while the other
algorithms report five errors. The same bar shows that the client-driven algorithm was as
fast as the CI-FS algorithm, but slower than the CI-FI algorithm.
For the 90 combinations of error detection clients and input programs, we find the
following:
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Fig. 13. Detecting format string vulnerabilities rarely benefits from either flow sensitivity or context sensitivity—
the client-driven algorithm is only slower because it is a two-pass algorithm.
Fig. 14. Detecting remote access vulnerabilities can require both flow sensitivity and context sensitivity. In these
cases the client-driven algorithm is both the most accurate and the most efficient.
• In all cases, the client-driven algorithm equals or beats the accuracy of the best fixed-
precision policy.
• In 66 of the 90 cases the client-driven algorithm also equals or beats the performance of
the comparably accurate fixed-precision algorithm. In 29 of these cases the client-driven
algorithm is both the fastest and the most accurate.
• In 20 of the remaining 24 cases the client-driven algorithm performs within a factor
of two or three of the best fixed-precision algorithm. In many of these cases the best
fixed-precision algorithm is the fastest fixed-precision algorithm, so in absolute terms
the execution times are all low.
Note that for many of the larger programs the fully flow-sensitive and context-sensitive
algorithm either runs out of memory or requires an intolerable amount of time. In these
106 S.Z. Guyer, C. Lin / Science of Computer Programming 58 (2005) 83–114
Fig. 15. Determining when a format string vulnerability is remotely exploitable is a more difficult analysis. The
execution time of the client-driven algorithm is still competitive with the fastest fixed-precision algorithm.
Fig. 16. Detecting FTP-like behavior is the most challenging analysis. In three cases (WU-FTP, privoxy, and
CFEngine) the client-driven algorithm achieves accuracy that we believe only the full-precision algorithm can
match—if it were able to run to completion.
cases we cannot measure the accuracy of this algorithm for comparison. However, we do
find that for the smaller programs the client-driven algorithm matches the accuracy of the
full-precision algorithm.
In general, the only cases where a fixed-policy algorithm performs better than the client-
driven algorithm are those in which the client requires little or no extra precision. In
particular, the format string vulnerability problem rarely seems to benefit from higher levels
of precision. In these cases, though, the analysis is usually so fast that the performance
difference is practically irrelevant. Fig. 18 shows that for these cases, the analysis time for
the client-driven algorithm is typically between 1 and 10 s.
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Table 5
The percent of all memory locations in each program that the client-driven algorithm chooses to analyze using
flow sensitivity
Program Percentage of memory locations set flow-sensitive
File FSV Remote Remote FTP
access access FSV behavior
stunnel-3.8 0.20 – – – 0.19
pfinger-0.7.8 – 0.53 0.20 0.53 0.61
muh2.05c 0.10 – – 0.07 0.31
muh2.05d 0.10 – – – 0.33
pure-ftpd-1.0.15 0.13 – 0.12 – 0.10
fcron-2.9.3 – – 0.03 – 0.26
apache-1.3.12 0.18 0.91 0.89 1.07 0.83
make-3.75 0.02 – – – 2.19
BlackHole-1.0.9 0.04 – 0.24 – 0.32
wu-ftpd-2.6.0 0.09 0.22 0.34 0.24 0.08
openssh-3.5p1-client 0.06 0.55 0.35 0.56 0.96
privoxy-3.0.0-stable 0.01 – – – 0.10
wu-ftpd-2.6.2 0.09 0.51 0.63 0.53 0.23
bind-4.9.4-REL 0.01 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.42
openssh-3.5p1-server 0.59 – 0.49 – 1.19
cfengine-1.5.4 0.04 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.03
sqlite-2.7.6 0.01 – 1.47 – 1.43
nn-6.5.6 0.17 1.99 1.82 2.03 0.97
We show this value as a percentage because the overall numbers are large. Dashes indicate that no memory
locations were analyzed using flow sensitivity.
For the problems that do require more precision, the client-driven algorithm consistently
outperforms the fixed-precision algorithms. Tables 5 and 6 provide some insight into this
result. For each program and each client, we record the number of procedures that the
algorithm makes context-sensitive and the percentage of memory locations that it makes
flow-sensitive. From these tables, we draw several conclusions:
• Looking at the columns, we find that different clients have different precision
requirements. The file access client, for example, benefits from some flow sensitivity
but not context sensitivity; the FTP behavior client requires both. These statistics show
that client analyses often need some extra precision, but only a very small amount.
• While the client-driven algorithm might needlessly analyze some variables with flow
sensitivity, the amount of such extra precision is minimal. For example, Fig. 13 shows
that the format string vulnerability requires flow sensitivity for only one benchmark,
nn, and Table 5 shows that the client-driven algorithm does not use any flow sensitivity
for ten of the benchmarks; for the others excluding nn, it uses very little flow sensitivity.
• From Figs. 12–16, we determine that only seven of the 90 problem instances require
any context sensitivity. From Table 6, we see that only a tiny fraction of procedures are
analyzed in this way, suggesting that while faster techniques may exist for implementing
context sensitivity, we can actually avoid it altogether in most cases.
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Table 6
The number of procedures in each program that the client-driven algorithm chooses to analyze using context
sensitivity
Program Total procedures Number of procedures set context-sensitive
File FSV Remote Remote FTP
access access FSV behavior
stunnel-3.8 42 – – – – –
pfinger-0.7.8 47 – – 1 – –
muh2.05c 84 – – – – 6
muh2.05d 84 – – – – 6
pure-ftpd-1.0.15 116 – – 2 – 9
fcron-2.9.3 100 – – – – –
apache-1.3.12 313 – 2 8 2 10
make-3.75 167 – – – – –
BlackHole-1.0.9 71 – – 2 – 5
wu-ftpd-2.6.0 183 – – – – 17
openssh-3.5p1-client 441 1 – 10 – –
privoxy-3.0.0-stable 223 – – – – 5
wu-ftpd-2.6.2 205 – 4 – 4 17
bind-4.9.4-REL 210 – 2 1 1 4
openssh-3.5p1-server 601 1 – 13 – –
cfengine-1.5.4 421 – 1 4 3 31
sqlite-2.7.6 387 – – – – –
nn-6.5.6 494 – 1 2 1 30
Dashes indicate that no procedures were analyzed using context sensitivity.
6.1. Client-specific results
The client-driven algorithm reveals some significant differences between the precision
requirements of the five error detection problems.
Fig. 12 shows the results for the file access client, which benefits significantly from
flow sensitivity but not from context sensitivity. This result makes sense because the state
of a file handle can change over time, but most procedures only accept open file handles
as arguments. We suspect that few of these error reports represent true errors, and we
believe that many of the remaining false positives could be eliminated using path-sensitive
analysis.
Fig. 13 shows the results for detecting format string vulnerabilities. The taintedness
analysis that we use to detect format string vulnerabilities generally requires no extra
precision beyond the CI-FI analysis. We might expect utility functions, such as string
copying, to have unrealizable paths that cause spurious errors, but this does not happen in
any of our example programs. The high false positive rates observed in previous work [27]
are probably due to the use of equality-based analysis.
Fig. 14 shows the results for remote access vulnerability detection. Accurate detection
of remote access vulnerabilities requires both flow sensitivity and context sensitivity
because the “domino effect” of the underlying Trust analysis causes information loss to
propagate to many parts of the program. For example, all of the false positives in BlackHole
are due to unrealizable paths through a single function called my_strlcpy(), which
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implements string copying. The client-driven algorithm detects the problem and makes the
routine context-sensitive, which eliminates all the false positives.
Fig. 15 shows the results for determining the remote exploitability of format string
vulnerabilities. We find that this client is particularly difficult for the client-driven
analysis, which tends to add too much precision without lowering the false positive
count. Interestingly, many spurious FSV errors are caused by typos in the program: for
example, cfengine calls sprintf() in several places without providing the string
buffer argument.
For two of the input programs,muh and wu-ftp, we use two versions of each program:
one version known to contain format string vulnerabilities and a subsequent version with
the bugs fixed. Our system accurately detects the known vulnerabilities in the old versions
and confirms their absence in the newer versions. Our analysis also finds the known
vulnerabilities in several other programs, including stunnel, cfengine, sshd, and
named. In addition, our system reports a format string vulnerability in the Apache web
server. Manual inspection, however, shows that it is unexploitable for algorithmic reasons
that are beyond the scope of our analysis.
Fig. 16 shows the results for detecting FTP-like behavior, which is the most challenging
of our problems because it depends on the states of multiple memory locations and multiple
client analyses. Even for this more demanding problem, our client-driven analysis properly
detects exactly those program points in the two FTP daemons that perform the “get” or
“put” file transfer functions. Context sensitivity helps eliminate a false positive in one
interesting case: in wu-ftp, a data transfer function appears to contain an error because
the source and target could either be files or sockets. However, when the calling contexts
are separated, the combinations that actually occur are file-to-file and socket-to-socket.
6.2. Program-specific results
This section describes some of the significant challenges that the input programs present
for static analysis.
6.2.1. Function tables
Some of the programs use tables of function pointers that are similar to virtual
function tables in C++. Unfortunately, these tables are indexed by strings, making it
practically impossible to reduce the number of possible call targets. As a result, the
dispatch procedures, which access the table and call through the function pointer, end up
significantly polluting the call graph.
6.2.2. Library wrappers
Many of the programs put wrappers around standard library functions or provide their
own implementations of these functions. For example, many programs put a wrapper
around strdup() that handles a null pointer or that exits gracefully if memory is
exhausted. The client-driven algorithm works well in these cases because it makes the
wrapper functions context-sensitive. Occasionally, however, there are so many calls to
these functions that the cost of context sensitivity explodes.
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global { strtok_static_pointer }
procedure strtok(str, find_str)
{
on_entry { str --> string
find_str --> find_string
strtok_static_pointer --> previous_string }
access { string, find_string }
on_exit {
if (str == 0) { strtok_static_pointer --> previous_string
return --> previous_string }
default { strtok_static_pointer --> string
return --> string }
}
}
Fig. 17. Annotations for strtok properly model its internal state.
6.2.3. Custom memory allocators
A few of the programs use custom memory allocators. Apache is particularly
problematic because it implements a region-like allocator with semantics unlike the
conventional heap or stack allocation. Luckily, there is an option to compile it using the
regular malloc interface. In general, though, many analysis tools rely on the semantics of
malloc and free to build an accurate model of heap objects: since multiple calls to malloc
always return distinct chunks of memory, there is no need to explicitly model the address
space.
6.2.4. Internal library state
A number of library routines contain an internal state that is not explicitly represented
in their interfaces. The string tokenizer function strtok(), in particular, can present
a challenge for static analysis because it stores non-null input strings in a hidden global
variable and returns pointers into the most recently stored string on null inputs. Fig. 17
shows how we can easily model this behavior using the annotation language. The global
variable strtok_static_pointer is synthetic and only exists for the purposes of
analysis. The client-driven analysis often decides to make this variable flow-sensitive in
order to distinguish between different tokenized strings.
6.3. Average performance
Figs. 18 and 19 show the performance of the different algorithms averaged over all
five clients. These two graphs show the actual execution time in seconds and the memory
usage in megabytes. We see that the client-driven algorithm is quite efficient. In most cases
the client-driven algorithm performs almost as well as the fastest fixed-policy algorithm—
the flow-insensitive context-insensitive algorithm. As we saw in Figs. 12–16, in the cases
where the client-driven algorithm uses more resources, it produces a better result: it takes
more time, but it eliminates false positives.
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Fig. 18. The client-driven algorithm performs competitively with the fastest fixed-precision algorithm.
Fig. 19. Memory usage is only a significant problem for the fully context-sensitive algorithms. More efficient
implementations exist, but we find that full context sensitivity is not needed.
6.4. Discussion and future work
The current implementation of the client-driven algorithm manages just two aspects of
precision—flow sensitivity and context sensitivity—but precision could be improved by
handling other aspects as well. For example, more precise algorithms exist for handling
control-flow and for modeling heap objects. While our algorithm can detect information
loss in these situations, we currently have no mechanism to address them. We could
imagine using path-sensitive techniques when the algorithm detects information loss at a
control-flow merge. Similarly, we could employ shape analysis for heap objects that merge
information.
The client-driven approach might also be extended to improve its scalability. One
promising direction would be to first perform an equality-based pointer analysis, which can
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scale to programs with a million lines of code [29]. We can then apply our existing client-
driven algorithm in places where we detect information loss due to unification. Finally, our
algorithm might be combined with other approaches, such as demand-driven analysis [20],
to yield further improvements in accuracy and scalability.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a new client-driven approach to managing the trade-
off between cost and precision in pointer analysis. We have shown that such an approach
is needed because no single fixed-precision analysis is appropriate for all client problems
and programs. The low-precision algorithms do not provide sufficient accuracy for the
more challenging client analysis problems, while the high-precision algorithms often do
not complete. Rather than choose any of these fixed-precision policies, we exploit the
fact that many client analyses require only a small amount of extra precision applied to
specific places in each input program. Our client-driven algorithm can effectively detect
these places and automatically apply the necessary additional precision.
Looking to the future, we believe that the client-driven algorithm provides a blueprint
for the deployment of more sophisticated but expensive pointer analysis techniques.
For example, shape analysis can be extremely expensive, but perhaps in a client-driven
framework it can be profitably applied to very small portions of the programs.
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